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Abstract: 
The "clean development mechanism" (CDM) is the most important outcome for implementing 
the Kyoto Protocol. It is expected to help the developed countries meet their obligations of 
greenhouse gases reduction while at the same time promoting sustainable" development in the 
developing countries for environmental protection and energy efficiency. This paper identifies 
two critical economic factors that will determine the effectiveness of CDM. The first is the 
associated transaction costs that will reduce the attractiveness of the CDM compared to other 
domestic options for energy investment, The second factor is the methodologies available for 
reducing the carbon emission and improving energy efficiency. We explain how these two 
factors affect the exchange of demand and supply through the CDM projects. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Scientists generally agree that the global climate change poses a substantial threat, as many food- 
producing regions are vulnerable to drought and much of the world's human population is 
vulnerable to natural disasters involving extreme weather. Moreover the rate of change of 
temperature will be too fast for many species to adapt or migrate (Grace 2004). The greenhouse 
gases that are especially important are: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide 
(N20), all of which have been rising fast over the last few decades. Carbon dioxide is the main 
product of fossil fuel burning. and is quantitatively the most important. The fundamental element 
for the success of the CDM is the participation of a broad cross-section of buyers, ultimately 
from developed countries, and sellers from developing countries, of CERs (Mendis and 
Openshaw 2004). The trading process in CDM starts with project formulation, through 
successful implementation and then certification (Kumbaroglua et al 2004, Brent 2005). 
Development projects that are eligible for CDM funding require final approval from the host 
countries where the projects are to be implementeded. The approval requires an evaluation of the 
positive contribution of the CDM project to sustainable development in the host country. An 
executive Board (EB) was appointed and this EB is in charge of proposing workable ground 
rules to promote the CDM. Three broad kinds of projects qualify for the CDM, these are: (1) 
renewable energy projects that will be alternatives to fossil fuel projects: (2) sequestration 
projects that offset green house gas emissions; (3) energy efficient projects that will decrease the 
emissions of green house gas. It is possible to have a combination of these initiatives. 
This paper identifies two critical factors that will affect the demand and supply through the 
CDM, The first is the associated transaction costs that will reduce the attractiveness of the CDM 
compared to domestic green house gas abatement options. The CDM in particular is likely to 
entail considerable costs of baseline development, project registration, verification and 
certification. The second factor is the methodologies available for reducing the carbon emission 
and energy efficiency. Under the current system of the CDM, the Methodology Panel assesses 
submitted new methodologies and recommends and submits them to the EB to discuss. The 
transaction cost may decline over time as more approved baseline and monitoring methodologies 
become available, Those methodologies will reduce the fixed component for the transaction 
costs. To guarantee that applied projects ensure emission reductions, the CDM Executive Board 
(EB) and its Methodology Panel assess the baseline scenario, additionality of the projects, and 
monitoring plan. 
 
Figure 1 lays out a market-based framework for promoting CDM transactions between private 
sector project developers and traders and public sector policy makers, with regulators, governed 
by CDM rules, overseeing the smooth running of the CDM. The remainder of the paper is 
organized as follows. First we briefly discuss the supply and demand can be coordinated through 
the market mechanism of CDM, Next we investigate the transaction costs that will reduce the 
attractiveness of the CDM compared to domestic green house gas abatement options. After that, 
we discuss the methodologies available for reducing the carbon emission and energy efficiency. 
 
 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF CDM 
,The clean development mechanism (CDM) is often seen as providing the financial benefits 
and transfers of cutting-edge green technology that enable developing countries to reduce 
emissions and achieve their sustainable development goals. Market-based and emissions 
trading approaches can enable governments to put in place systems to encourage innovation in 
industry while at the same time providing environmental certainty, credibility and cost-
efficiency in meeting reduction targets (PCFPlus 2004). 
 
The last few years have seen the emergence of an entirely new market, one that creates value for 
greenhouse gas emission reductions. A robust and efficient carbon market can play a significant 
role in a future global climate regime by helping to minimize costs and mobilize worldwide 
investments in the low- carbon technologies needed to achieve deep long-term greenhouse gas 
reductions (Grace 2004). Rather than a single carbon market there is a mosaic of markets that 
differ in timing. location, relationship to the Protocol and their compliance-based versus 
voluntary nature. While the underlying commodity may seem the some (e.g. Mega-ton of CO2 
equivalent or MtCO2e), the buyers, sellers and carbon prices can be quite different. The 
estimated potential for the CDM is disaggregated both by geographic region and project type that 
could affect the demand and supply of CERs from CDM projects. 
 
The CDM demand mostly involves the governments of Annex B countries (as buyers) through 
the CDM. But there are gaps; for example, only a relatively small percentage of GHG emissions 
sources in industrialized countries are covered by a trading-based market mechanism linking 
them to a common international carbon market. Cumulated demand for Kyoto units in 2010, 
excluding Australia and the United States, is estimated at about 925 Mega-ton of CO2 equivalent 
(MtCO2e) that ranges between 600 and 1,150 MtCO2e at a price of $11.00 /tCO2e (range +1- 
50%). While some regional initiatives in the US and Australia are emerging, no US or Australian 
emissions are currently linked (PCFplus 2004). 
 
To illustrate the results, in Figure 2 we compare the total emission reduction of different 
countries. Geographical distribution of the amount of emission reduction is expected to be biased 
to reflect the regional diversity of investment capability on capacity building. While Latin 
American countries are eager to build institutions necessary for approval of CDM projects, most 
of the credits will be generated from the Asian countries. 
 
Finally, the market potential for the CDM depends critically upon preferences by buyer 
governments for CERs and ERUs, proposed regulations that allow only CERs and ERUs to be 
exchanged for EU allowances, and economic incentives for Russia and the Ukraine to limit the 
sale of their surplus Kyoto units. China represents 35 to 45% of the estimated total CDM 
potential in 2010, comparable to the estimated potential of Latin America, Africa and the Middle 
East combined. Thus the scale of CDM activity in China affects the total supply of CERs 
(PCFplus 2004). 
 
TRANSACTION COST: THE BARRIER OF CDM 
The CDM is a critical first step and is the only Kyoto flexibility mechanism that engages 
developing countries (Bell and Drexhage 2005). However, CDM pro incur relatively large fixed 
transaction costs prior to registration (Michaelowaa and Jotzo 2005). The process of 
implementing the mechanism is fraught with challenges. The absence of the United States in the 
carbon market has induced the low price of certified emissions reductions through the CDM, 
while host countries desire to ensure the sustainable development benefits of the CDM is likely 
to result in a complex approval process, which would further increase transaction costs. The 
CDM in particular is likely to entail consderable costs of baseline development, project 
registration, verification and certification. As a result, transaction costs and institutional rigidities 
will reduce the attractiveness as compared to domestic green house gas abatement options_ The 
activities implemented jointly pilot phase and the prototype carbon fund program give 
indications that projects with high implementation costs have high transaction costs as well 
(Michaelowaa and Jotzo 2005). Moreover, CDM projects have to be approved by host country 
institutions, and so far only a small share of host countries has been able to set up these 
institutions. Several of the larger host countries intend to only approve projects if the market 
price is above a certain threshold. Some governments will also levy fees to finance costs of 
approval bodies. Therefore, the opportunity of achieving the potential efficiency and 
effectiveness of project investment is significantly limited. 
 
There has been sustainable development criterion developed by the Designated National 
Authorities (DNA) of each developing country that hosts the project, as of March 2006, DNAs 
are established in 72 countries, However, there is no standardized international CDM sustainable 
development criterion and few guidelines available on project design and the methodology for 
assessment. A common practice is to use an evaluation process, such as weighted values, that 
reflect economic, environmental, and social priorities. Many developed countries and 
international organizations provided assistance that ranges from training, project finding to 
development of Project Design Document (Kummbaroglua et 2004), Because CDM projects 
incur relatively large fixed transaction costs prior to registration, the economics of scale set 
threshold for projects to be financially viable. Analytical studies sugget a minimum project size 
of 50 000 tCO2e per year. Data from existing and identified projects suggest that the minimum 
size is about 100 000 tCO2e per year. The average size of existing and identified projects is over 
150 000 tCO2e per year. The minimum size of an economically viable project may decline over 
time as more approved baseline and monitoring methodologies become available. Those 
methodologies will reduce the fixed component for the transaction costs. However, the minimum 
size is likely to remain above 50 000 tCO2e per year for regular CDM projects (PCFPlus 2004). 
 
The transaction costs for CDM is estimated in Table 1. For a small project, the transaction costs 
tend to be prohibitively higher than the large project (Michaelowaa and Jotzo 2005). 
 
Other challenges also arise from high transaction cost inherent to CDM. For example, evaluating 
project- based reductions requires assigning a baseline for the emissions that would occur in the 
absence of the project; that counterfactual cannot be measured, and considerable uncertainty 
surrounds it (Fischer 2004). Next, access to information will likely be asymmetric: the third-
party monitor that will certify  emissions reductions will know less about the project 
fundamentals than the investing and recipient parties, Asymmetry in access to information is a 
potentially serious problem for calculating CERs. Because participation in CDM projects is 
voluntary, certain baseline allocation methods run the risk of selection bias—attracting 
participants who would be predisposed to making such investments and having low emissions 
anyway. In addition, the certifying agent is limited in its ability to design a contract that would 
elicit truthful information from CDM participants regarding their investment intentions. Finally, 
the certification authority can only set the amount of abatement credits, while market forces 
determine the value of emissions reductions. This adds significant uncertainty to the CDM 
projects. 
 
The combination of those factors means that rules for determining baseline emissions—the 
benchmark against which actual emissions will be measured and reductions will be certified—
may be systematically biased. The costs of poor baseline determination range from under-
allocation, which means forgoing some worthy projects, to over-allocation, which expands the 
global emissions cap and may encourage some unjustified investments. 
 
OPERATION METHODOLOGY: THE DRIVEN FORCE OF CDM 
CDM is governed by the CDM Executive Board (CDM-EB). In addition there was also 
established the Methodology, Small Scale CDM and Accreditation Panels. The Panels, with their 
technical capability, drafted a report regarding development of emission reduction estimation 
methodology to the CDM-EB for their consideration. Under the current system of the CDM, the 
Methodology Panel assesses submitted new methodologies and recommends and submits them 
to the EB to discuss. The CDM-EB of United Nation had approved 23 methodologies, out of 89 
proposals, by March 2006. Also, two consolidated methodologies were approved for landfill 
methane recovery and renewable power generation connected to an existing power grid. Among 
the 23 approved methodologies, 4 address energy efficiency. 2 address industrial gases, 5 
renewable energy and 9 fugitive methane emissions. Of 74 projects available for public 
comments in the validation process, 46 concern renewable electricity generation, 24 fugitive 
methane emissions and only 2 energy efficiency. The detailed information of approved CDM 
methodologies can be found in (UNFCCC 2006). 
 
Although, the CDM has emerged as an entirely new market to create value for greenhouse gas 
emission reductions, in the longer term, the CDM is somewhat constrained by its project-based 
framework, In the future, a broader scope of complementary approaches is needed for the carbon 
market to be effective in influencing large-scale capital infrastructure investments in developing 
countries over the next 20 years. The effectiveness of the carbon market in mobilizing 
investments in long-lived capital stock also depends on polices that ensure long-term value for 
emission reductions. 
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